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EPISTEMIC UTILITY AND THE 
NORMATIVITY OF LOGIC 
Richard PETTIGREW 
ABSTRACT: How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as 
some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of 
doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge 
principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern 
the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a 
novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we assume that doxastic 
attitudes have different epistemic value depending on how accurately they represent the 
world. We then use the principles of decision theory to determine which of the putative 
logic-rationality bridge principles we can derive from considerations of epistemic utility. 
KEYWORDS: normativity of logic, epistemic value, accuracy-first epistemology 
 
How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? 
What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of 
doxastic rationality? Here are some putative norms that seek to connect logic and 
rational belief: 
(BP1) If Priest’s Logic of Paradox governs propositions 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐵 is strictly 
stronger than 𝐴 in that logic, then, if you believe 𝐴, then you ought to believe 𝐵. 
(BP2) If classical logic governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 together entail 𝐵 in 
that logic, then you ought not to believe each of 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 while disbelieving 𝐵. 
(BP3) If you know that strong Kleene logic governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and you know that 𝐴 
entails 𝐵 in that logic, then you have reason to see to it that your credence in 𝐴 is 
at most your credence in 𝐵. 
These illustrate something of the variety of claims that we might make in 
this area. Following John MacFarlane, we call such claims bridge principles—in 
particular, they are logic-rationality bridge principles.1 Below, I will extend 
MacFarlane’s taxonomy of such bridge principles to bring some order to this 
variety. Having done that, I wish to explore a novel way of adjudicating between 
them. In the existing literature, the following sorts of reasons are used to justify 
rejecting a given proposal of this sort: 
                                                        
1 John MacFarlane, “In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?” (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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Conflicts with intuition.  For instance, we might reject (BP2) by appealing to our 
intuitive reaction to cases like Makinson’s Preface Paradox.2 Suppose 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 
enumerate all of my beliefs about British birdlife. So, for each 𝐴𝑖, I believe it. But 
I also realise that I am fallible on this topic. And thus, I disbelieve 𝐵, the 
proposition that all of my beliefs are true—that is, I disbelieve 𝐵 = 𝐴1 & …  & 𝐴𝑛. 
Nonetheless, 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 together entail 𝐵. So I violate (BP2). Yet intuitively, we 
judge that I am perfectly rational. For this reason, some argue, we should reject 
(BP2). 
Conflicts with ought-can. It is often noted that principles like (BP1) are extremely 
demanding, partly because we are not in a position to discover all the logical 
consequences of our beliefs, but also because, even if we could, we would be 
unable to store beliefs in all of them.3 Suppose, for instance, that 𝐴 is the 
conjunction of the second-order Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic. Then 
presumably we cannot discover all of the consequences of 𝐴; and even if we 
could, we could not store them.4 Thus, we might take (BP1) to fail on the grounds 
that it conflicts with an ought-can principle. 
Also, in recent unpublished work, Claire Field and Bruno Jacinto have tried 
to justify bridge principles in the following way:5 
Justification on the basis of norms.  They consider various norms that govern our 
beliefs. They consider the Truth Norm of Belief and the Knowledge Norm of 
Belief. And they ask which bridge principles follow from those norms. When 
considering the consequence of the Knowledge Norm for Belief, they consider the 
effects of assuming different frame conditions on the accessibility relation in the 
epistemic logic. 
I wish to explore an alternative approach: sometimes this approach supplies 
a reason for rejecting a putative logic-rationality bridge principle, and sometimes it 
supplies a justification for accepting such a principle. 
Justification by appeal to epistemic utility. In recent years, a number of 
philosophers have appealed to considerations of epistemic utility in order to 
justify various epistemic norms. Kenny Easwaran, Branden Fitelson, and Kevin 
Dorst have sought to establish the Lockean thesis concerning the normative link 
between credences and full beliefs, while Ted Shear, Branden Fitelson, and 
                                                        
2 David Makinson, “The Paradox of the Preface,” Analysis 25, 6 (1965): 205-207. 
3 Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986) 
4 And, even if we could store them, surely that would not be a good use of our storage facilities. 
Note, however, that this last point does not turn on a conflict with an ought-can principle, but 
rather a conflict with a plausible principle governing how we should sensibly use our limited 
storage capacities. 
5 Field and Jacinto presented this work at a conference, The Normativity of Logic, held at the 
University of Bergen, 14-16 June 2017. 
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Jonathan Weisberg have offered justifications of some of the principles of belief 
revision.6 On the credal side of epistemology, Jim Joyce and I have offered very 
closely related epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism,7 Together, Hilary 
Greaves and David Wallace have argued for Conditionalization on this basis, and 
R. A. Briggs and I have recently offered an alternative justification of that 
updating rule;8 Jason Konek and I have both sought to justify the Principal 
Principle;9 I have provided a rationalisation of the Principle of Indifference;10 
Sarah Moss and Ben Levinstein have both sought norms that govern peer 
disagreement situations;11 and Miriam Schoenfield has appealed to accuracy 
considerations to motivate a particular solution to the problem of higher-order 
evidence.12 
We will spell out the idea behind these arguments in detail below, but 
roughly it is this. Our actions have different pragmatic value given different ways 
the world might be. We call this their utility. For instance, my action of betting 
that Labour will win the next UK General Election has high utility in worlds 
where they win and low utility in worlds where they lose. Similarly, our doxastic 
states—either our full beliefs, disbeliefs and suspensions of judgements, or our 
                                                        
6 Kevin Dorst, “Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy,” Mind (forthcoming), Kenny Easwaran 
“Dr Truthlove, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities,” Noûs 50, 
4 (2016): 816–853, Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence,” 
in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 5, eds.  Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), Ted Shear, Branden Fitelson, and Jonathan Weisberg, 
“Two Approaches to Belief Revision” (unpublished manuscript). 
7 James M. Joyce, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” Philosophy of Science 65, 4 
(1998): 575–603, James M. Joyce. “Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic 
Epistemology of Partial Belief’ in Franz Huber, & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) Degrees of 
Belief. (Springer, 2009), Richard Pettigrew, Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
8 Hilary Greaves and David Wallace, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization 
Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility,” Mind 115, 459 (2006): 607–632, R. A. Briggs and Richard 
Pettigrew, “An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization” (unpublished 
manuscript). 
9 Jason Konek, “The Simplest Possible Accuracy Argument for the Principal Principle” 
(unpublished manuscript), Richard Pettigrew, “A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the 
Principal Principle,” Episteme 10, 1 (2013): 19–35. 
10 Richard Pettigrew, “Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 92, 1 (2016): 35–59. 
11 Sarah Moss, “Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise,” Mind 120, 480 (2011): 1053–1069. 
Benjamin A. Levinstein, “With All Due Respect: The Macro-Epistemology of Disagreement,” 
Philosophers’ Imprint 15, 3 (2015): 1–20. 
12 Miriam Schoenfield, “An Accuracy-Based Approach to Higher-Order Evidence,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming). 
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credences—have different epistemic value given different ways the world might 
be. We will call this their epistemic utility. For instance, we might say that a true 
belief is more valuable than a false one, and a high credence in a true proposition is 
more valuable than that same high credence in a false proposition. Just as we 
choose between our actions using the principles of decision theory, so we might 
pick between different doxastic states using those same principles. After all, these 
decision-theoretic principles are simply claims about how facts about rationality 
are determined by facts about value—they govern how epistemic utility 
determines epistemic rationality just as much as they govern how pragmatic utility 
determines pragmatic rationality. Thus, just as previous authors have tested norms 
like Probabilism, Conditionalization, etc. by asking whether they follow from the 
principles of decision theory together with a particular account of epistemic utility, 
so we might test principles like (BP1), (BP2), (BP3), and their ilk, which claim to 
connect logic and rationality, in the same way. 
It’s worth emphasising here that proceeding in this way seems natural—
more natural, perhaps, than appealing to intuition or to an ought-can principle. 
Presumably a large part of the reason why we think that logic might be normative 
for belief is that we think that beliefs aim at the truth; that is, we think that beliefs 
are better when true and worse when false. And presumably we also recognise that 
logic is the study of the relationships between the truth values of different 
propositions. If that’s right, you should expect logic to tell you something about 
how best to obtain the aim of belief. Epistemic utility theory allows us to explore 
exactly how this might work. That’s not to say that this is the only framework in 
which to explore this: seeking out the consequences of the Truth Norm for Belief, 
as Field and Jacinto do, is an alternative approach. But I hope to convince you that 
it is a fruitful way to do so. 
A Taxonomy of Bridge Principles 
Each principle that purports to connect logic and rationality shares the same form. 
It is a conditional. Its antecedent is a proposition 𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿). 𝑇 is a claim about the 
logic that governs some set of propositions; 𝐿 is a claim about the consequence 
relation of that logic; A is a propositional operator that acts on the conjunction, T 
& L. The consequent of a bridge principle is a normative claim 𝐶 concerning an 
agent’s beliefs or credences. Thus, our logic-rationality bridge principles have the 
form 𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) → 𝐶. 
In (BP1), 𝑇 is the claim that the Logic of Paradox governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐿 is 
the claim that 𝐴 entails 𝐵 in that logic, but 𝐵 does not entail 𝐴. In (BP3), 𝑇 is the 
claim that strong Kleene logic governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, while 𝐿 is the claim that 𝐴 entails 
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𝐵. In (BP1) and (BP2), 𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) is just 𝑇 & 𝐿, so A is the identity operator in this 
case, whereas in (BP3), 𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) is the proposition that you know 𝑇 & 𝐿, so that A 
is the knowledge operator in this case. In (BP1), 𝐶 is the conditional: if you believe 
𝐴, then you ought to believe 𝐵. That is, 𝐶 is a narrow scope norm. In (BP2), 𝐶 is a 
wide scope norm: it ought not to be that you believe each of 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 and you 
disbelieve 𝐵. In (BP3), the normative claim in the consequent is not stated in terms 
of ought at all; it is stated in terms of reasons, so it is weaker. 
We now expand a little on John MacFarlane’s taxonomy for bridge 
principles. MacFarlane lists a number of dimensions along which bridge principles 
can differ, and he lists the ways in which they might differ along these different 
dimensions. I simply add a couple of further dimensions to his list. 
Grain  What sort of doxastic states does the norm govern? 
Credences  The norm governs credences or degrees of belief. 
Full beliefs  The norm governs full beliefs, full disbeliefs, and suspensions of 
judgment. 
Normativity  What sort of norm is 𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) → 𝐶?13 
Evaluation  It is used only to evaluate an agent’s doxastic state. 
Appraisal  It is used to apportion epistemic blame and fault to the agent. 
Directive  It is used to direct the agent’s doxastic life. 
Governing logic Which logic governs the propositions in question, according to 𝑇? 
Classical  We denote the consequence relation of this logic ⊨cl 
Strong Kleene logic  We denote the consequence relation of this logic  ⊨skl 
Logic of Paradox  We denote the consequence relation of this logic  ⊨lp 
and so on... 
Strength of logical claim What is the strength of the claim 𝐿 about logical 
consequence that occurs in the antecedent? Weak or strong? 
Weak  𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵. 
Strong  𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ⊭ 𝐴. 
Antecedent operator What is the operator 𝐴 in the antecedent 𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿)? That is, 
under what conditions on 𝑇 & 𝐿 does the bridge principle get triggered? 
Identity  𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) = 𝑇 & 𝐿. 
                                                        
13 Cf. Florian Steinberger, “Three ways in which logic might be normative” (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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Obvious  𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) = 𝑇 & 𝐿 is obvious. 
Knowledge  𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) = You know  𝑇 & 𝐿. 
Belief  𝐴(𝑇 & 𝐿) = You believe  𝑇 & 𝐿.  
Number of premises  𝐿 is a fact about logical consequence. That is, it is a 
proposition of the form 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨ 𝐵 for some propositions 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵. What is 
𝑛? 
Consequent operator  What is the operator in the consequent 𝐶? Is it an ought 
operator, a reasons operator, or a permission operator? 
Ought  𝐶 states a norm in terms of ought. 
Reasons  𝐶 states a norm in terms of reasons. 
Permission  𝐶 states a norm in terms of permission. 
Consequent scope  What is the scope of the operator found in the consequent 𝐶? 
Does it apply to the consequent of the conditional only, both antecedent and 
consequent separately, or the whole conditional together? 
Consequent  𝐶 takes the form 𝑋 → 𝑁(𝑌), where 𝑁 is the normative operator 
identified in the previous condition. Thus, 𝐶 is a narrow scope norm. 
Whole  𝐶 takes the form 𝑁(𝑋 → 𝑌). Thus, 𝐶 is a wide scope norm. 
Both  𝐶 takes the form 𝑁(𝑋) → 𝑁(𝑌). 
Polarity  What is the strength of the claim in the consequent of the conditional in 
𝐶? 
Positive The consequent of the conditional in 𝐶 is a positive demand that the 
agent has a particular attitude. 
Negative The consequent of the conditional in 𝐶 is a negative demand that the 
agent does not have a particular attitude. 
Picking a different answer for each of these gives a different putative 
normative claim about the connection between logic and rationality. Thus, for 
instance, (BP1) arises from the following choices: it governs full beliefs; the logic is 
Logic of Paradox; the logical claim is weak; the operator in the antecedent is the 
identity operator; the claim about logical consequent involves just a single premise; 
the operator in the consequent is the ought operator and that operator takes 
narrow scope in the consequent; and the polarity of the consequent is positive. 
In what follows, we’ll use epistemic utility to adjudicate between these 
different bridge principles. We’ll divide our treatment into two parts: first, we’ll 
treat full beliefs; second, we’ll treat credences. 
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Bridge Principles for Full Beliefs 
We begin by considering epistemic utility for full beliefs. I will present the now-
standard veritist story for the classical case. This originates with Carl Hempel, but 
in its current form it is due to work by Kevin Dorst, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden 
Fitelson.14 After that, I will extend it to the non-classical case. 
Suppose you entertain a particular proposition; it is there before your mind. 
Then there are three categorical doxastic attitudes that you might adopt towards it: 
you can believe it (B), disbelieve it (D), or suspend judgment on it (S). Suppose ℱ is 
the set of propositions that you entertain. We can represent your doxastic state by 
a function 𝑏 ∶ ℱ → {𝐁, 𝐒, 𝐃}. We call this your belief function. Our first order of 
business is to describe an epistemic utility function for doxastic states represented 
in this way. An epistemic utility function takes a doxastic state and a possible 
world and returns a measure of how much epistemic utility that state has at that 
possible world. Here and throughout, we will assume a veritist account. That is, we 
will assume that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for doxastic states 
is their accuracy; a doxastic state has greater epistemic value the more accurately it 
represents the world. One consequence of this is that the epistemic utility of your 
doxastic state at a possible world depends only on the truth values at that world of 
the propositions that you entertain. So, just as we can represent a doxastic state as a 
function from ℱ to the set of possible doxastic attitudes, so we can represent a 
possible world as a consistent valuation function from ℱ to the set of possible truth 
values. Since we are currently presenting the classical case, the set of truth values is 
{𝐭, 𝐟}, and the consistency in question is classical consistency. 
Now, we wish to define a function EU such that, if 𝑏 ∶ ℱ → {𝐁, 𝐒, 𝐃} is a 
belief function on ℱ and 𝑤 ∶ ℱ → {𝐭, 𝐟} is a classical valuation function on ℱ, then 
EU(𝑏, 𝑤) is the epistemic utility of the doxastic state represented by 𝑏 at the 
possible world represented by 𝑤. First, we assume that EU is additive: that is, 
EU(𝑏, 𝑤) is the sum of the epistemic utilities at 𝑤 of the different doxastic attitudes 
that 𝑏 comprises. That is, there is a local epistemic utility function eu ∶ {𝐭, 𝐟} ×
{𝐁, 𝐒, 𝐃} → [−∞, ∞] such that 
EU(𝑏, 𝑤) = ∑ eu(𝑤(𝑋), 𝑏(𝑋)
𝑋∈𝐹
)  
                                                        
14 Carl Hempel, “Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation,” in Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, vol. III, eds. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1962), 98–169, Dorst, “Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy,” Easwaran 
“Dr Truthlove,” Easwaran and Fitelson, “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.”  
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Thus, eu(𝐭, 𝐁) is the epistemic utility of believing a proposition when it is 
true, while eu(𝐭, 𝐃) is the epistemic utility of disbelieving a proposition when it is 
true, and so on. And eu(𝐭, 𝐁) +  eu(𝐟, 𝐁) is the epistemic utility of an agent with 
one belief in a truth and one belief in a falsehood and no other doxastic attitudes. 
Next, we identify our proposed local epistemic utility function. It is this: 
eu(𝐭, 𝐁) =  eu(𝐟, 𝐃) = 𝑅 (for getting it Right) 
eu(𝐭, 𝐒) =  eu(𝐟, 𝐒) = 0 
eu(𝐭, 𝐃) =  eu(𝐟, 𝐁) =  −𝑊 (for getting it Wrong) 
where 𝑅, 𝑊 > 0. Thus, true beliefs and false disbeliefs are equally valuable, with 
epistemic utility 𝑅; and they are more valuable than suspensions, which are 
equally valuable whatever the outcome, with epistemic utility 0; and they, in turn, 
are more valuable than false beliefs and true disbeliefs, which are equally valuable, 
with epistemic utility −𝑊. According to William James, two principles guide our 
epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error!.15 If you agree, you might take 𝑅 and 𝑊 to 
measure the strength of those two exhortations, respectively. The higher 𝑅, the 
more you care about getting things right; the higher 𝑊, the more you care about 
not getting things wrong. Thus, if 𝑅 > 𝑊, you might call yourself an epistemic 
radical; if 𝑅 = 𝑊, you are an epistemic centrist; and if 𝑊 > 𝑅, you are an epistemic 
conservative. 
Now, let’s see what these different positions have to say about the logic-
rationality bridge principles that we categorized at the beginning of the paper. 
Throughout, we will have cause to refer to five different belief functions defined 
on 𝐴 and 𝐵. We define them here for ease of reference: 
 
 A B 
𝑏1 B D 
𝑏2 B S 
𝑏∗ S S 
𝑏1
† D B 
𝑏2
† S B 
 
Thus, for instance, we might take 𝐴 to be Labour will win and 𝐵 to be 
Labour or the Greens will win. Thus, 𝑏1 believes that Labour will win, but 
disbelieves that Labour or the Greens will win, while 𝑏1
† switches those attitudes, 
disbelieving that Labour will win, but believing that Labour or the Greens will 
                                                        
15 William James, “The Will to Believe,” in The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (New York: Longmans Green, 1905). 
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win. Similarly, 𝑏2 believes Labour will win, but suspends on Labour or the Greens 
winning, while 𝑏2
† switches those attitudes. And 𝑏∗ suspends on both propositions. 
Let’s start with the epistemic conservative; for them, recall, 𝑊 > 𝑅. Then 
we have an epistemic utility argument for the following logic-rationality bridge 
principle:16 
(BP4) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, then you ought not to believe 𝐴 while 
disbelieving 𝐵. 
That is, when 𝐴 and 𝐵 are classical propositions, and 𝐴 classically entails 𝐵, 
you ought not to have the belief function 𝑏1. This is the single-premise version of 
the bridge principle that MacFarlane calls (Wo-). 
Here’s the argument for (BP4). Suppose 𝐴 classically entails 𝐵. Then 
consider 𝑏1 and 𝑏
∗. While 𝑏1 believes 𝐴 and disbelieves 𝐵, 𝑏
∗ suspends judgment 
on both. Now consider the different ways the world might be and the epistemic 
utility of the two belief functions at those different worlds: 
 
 A B EU(𝑏1, 𝑤) EU(𝑏
∗, 𝑤) 
𝑤1 t t 𝑅 − 𝑊 0 + 0 
𝑤2 t f 𝑅 + 𝑅 0 + 0 
𝑤3 f t −𝑊 − 𝑊 0 + 0 
𝑤4 f f −𝑊 + 𝑅 0 + 0 
 
Since 𝑊 > 𝑅, it follows that 𝑅 − 𝑊 < 0. Thus, at all worlds except the one at 
which 𝑏1 gets everything right—the world at which 𝐴 is true and 𝐵 is false—the 
epistemic utility of 𝑏1 is negative; and the epistemic utility of 𝑏
∗ is always 0. 
However, given that 𝐴 entails 𝐵, there is no world at which 𝐴 is true and 𝐵 is 
false—that is, 𝑤2 is not a classically consistent valuation and thus does not 
represent a genuine possibility. So, at all logically possible worlds—that is, at 𝑤1, 
𝑤3, and 𝑤4—𝑏
∗ has greater epistemic utility than 𝑏1. That is, as a matter of logical 
necessity, it is epistemically better to have belief function 𝑏∗ than 𝑏1. That is, 
EU(𝑏1, 𝑤) < EU(𝑏
∗, 𝑤) for all logically possible worlds 𝑤. In such cases, we say 
that 𝑏∗ strictly logically dominates 𝑏1 relative to EU. 
Now, in decision theory, strict logical dominance is often taken to be a sign 
of irrationality. That is, the following is taken to be a principle of rationality: 
Strict Logical Dominance If option 𝑜∗ has greater utility than option 𝑜 at every 
logically possible world, then 𝑜 is irrational. 
                                                        
16See Easwaran’s “Dr Truthlove,” for very closely related results in which the only categorical 
doxastic attitudes are belief and suspension. 
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Thus, we have our first epistemic utility argument for a logic-rationality 
bridge principle: 
(EU1) Epistemic Conservatism + Strict Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP4). 
Before we move on, it helps to see this argument in a particular case. 
Consider, then, the person who believes that Labour will win, and disbelieves that 
Labour or the Greens will win. Such a person would do better for sure if they were 
to suspend judgment on both propositions. If Labour do win, then their belief is 
true but their disbelief false, and that means that they have negative epistemic 
utility; if Labour don’t win but the Greens do, then they do maximally badly, since 
both attitudes are wrong, so they have negative epistemic utility; and if neither 
Labour nor the Greens win, then they are in the same situation as when Labour 
wins, namely, that one attitude is right and the other wrong, and that means that 
they have negative epistemic utility. Thus, they are guaranteed to have negative 
epistemic utility. On the other hand, if they were to suspend on both propositions, 
they would be guaranteed to have a neutral epistemic utility of 0. Thus, suspending 
dominates. 
Hopefully, this gives a taste of the sort of epistemic utility argument we will 
pursue in this paper. Each argument consists of the components: (i) an account of 
epistemic utility—in this case, we assumed Epistemic Conservativism; (ii) a 
decision-theoretic principle—in this case, Strict Logical Dominance; (iii) a 
mathematical fact that shows that, if you apply the decision-theoretic principle 
using the account of epistemic utility, you obtain the epistemic norm that you 
seek, such as (BP4)—in this case, we demonstrated the mathematical result using 
the truth table above. 
There are a number of ways in which we might try to adapt this argument. 
We might ask what happens when we switch Epistemic Conservatism for 
Epistemic Centrism or Epistemic Radicalism; or when we include more than one 
premise in the fact about logical consequence in the antecendent; or when we 
replace classical logic with some non-classical alternative; or when we consider the 
possibility of rational ignorance of logical truths. 
Epistemic Conservatism, Centrism, and Radicalism 
First, let’s see what happens when we move from Epistemic Conservatism to 
Epistemic Centrism or Epistemic Radicalism. Recall: according to Epistemic 
Centrism, 𝑅 = 𝑊—getting things right is exactly as good as getting things wrong is 
bad. Now, we can see from the table above that, for the Epistemic Centrist, 𝑏∗ does 
not strictly logically dominate 𝑏1. After all, at worlds at which 𝐴 and 𝐵 are both 
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true or both false, the epistemic utility of 𝑏1 (namely, 𝑅 − 𝑊) is the same as the 
epistemic utility of 𝑏∗ (namely, 0); it does not exceed it. And indeed it is 
straightforward to see that no alternative belief function strictly dominates 𝑏1.17 
Nonetheless, note that 𝑏∗ is at least as good, epistemically speaking, as 𝑏1 at all 
logically possible worlds, and strictly better at some. In such cases, we say that 𝑏∗ 
weakly logically dominates 𝑏1 relative to EU. In decision theory, weak logical 
dominance is often taken to be a sign of rationality in the same way that strict 
logical dominance is. That is, the following is taken to be a principle: 
Weak Logical Dominance If option 𝑜∗ has at least as great utility as option 𝑜 at 
every logically possible world, and greater utility at some, then 𝑜 is irrational. 
Now, note that, in order to apply this to the choice of belief functions on 𝐴 
and 𝐵, we must ensure that it is genuinely logically possible that 𝐴 is false and 𝐵 
true. That is, Weak Logical Dominance will tell us nothing when 𝐵 entails 𝐴. In 
that situation, 𝑏1 and 𝑏
∗ are equally good in every logically possible world, and 
there’s nothing irrational about picking an option with that feature. This gives us 
an epistemic utility argument for a slightly weaker version of (BP4): 
(BP5) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, and 𝐵 ⊭cl 𝐴, then you ought not to 
believe 𝐴 while disbelieving 𝐵. 
Here’s the argument: 
(EU2) Epistemic Centrism + Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP5). 
Weak Logical Dominance also proves crucial when we move to Epistemic 
Radicalism—that is, the claim that 𝑅 > 𝑊. It is clear from the table above that 𝑏∗ 
neither strictly nor weakly logically dominates 𝑏1 when 𝑅 > 𝑊. After all, in this 
situation, 𝑏1 outperforms 𝑏
∗ when 𝐴 and 𝐵 have the same truth value, since 
𝑅 − 𝑊 > 0. As above, it is straightforward to see that there is no alternative belief 
function that strictly dominates 𝑏1 for the Epistemic Radicalist. But there is an 
alternative that weakly dominates it, namely, 𝑏1
† from above. Recall: 𝑏1
† disbelieves 
𝐴 and believes 𝐵. 
 
 A B EU(𝑏1, 𝑤) EU(𝑏1
†, 𝑤) 
𝑤1 t t 𝑅 − 𝑊 −𝑊 + 𝑅 
𝑤2 t f 𝑅 + 𝑅 −𝑊 − 𝑊 
𝑤3 f t −𝑊 − 𝑊 𝑅 + 𝑅 
𝑤4 f f −𝑊 + 𝑅 𝑅 − 𝑊 
                                                        
17 By checking cases, we can see that, if a belief function 𝑏 strictly outperforms 𝑏1 when 𝐴 and 𝐵 
are both true, then 𝑏1 strictly outperforms 𝑏 when 𝐴 and 𝐵 are both false. 
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Thus, 𝑏1 and 𝑏1
† have the same epistemic value when 𝐴 and 𝐵 are both true 
or both false, and 𝑏1
† is strictly better than 𝑏1 when 𝐴 is false and 𝐵 is true. Thus, 
we have another epistemic utility argument for (BP5): 
(EU3) Epistemic Radicalism + Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP5). 
Thus, in sum: for every point on the scale between Epistemic Conservatism 
and Epistemic Radicalism, there is an epistemic utility argument for (BP5). Indeed, 
for every point on that scale, 𝑏1
† weakly logically dominates 𝑏1. Thus, we have: 
(EU4) Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP5). 
And, for Epistemic Conservatism, there is an epistemic utility argument for 
(BP4), namely, (EU1). 
Moreover, note that a similar trick can be used to establish the following 
bridge principle: 
(BP6) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, and 𝐵 ⊭cl 𝐴, then you ought not to 
believe 𝐴 while suspending judgment in 𝐵. 
That is, if 𝐴 is strictly stronger than 𝐵, then you ought not to have the belief 
function 𝑏2 defined above. We can justify this by noting that 𝑏2 is weakly logically 
dominated by 𝑏2
†, which we defined above. Recall: 𝑏2
† suspends on 𝐴 and believes 
𝐵. 
 
 A B EU(𝑏2, 𝑤) EU(𝑏2
†, 𝑤) 
𝑤1 t t 𝑅 − 0 0 + 𝑅 
𝑤2 t f 𝑅 + 0 0 − 𝑊 
𝑤3 f t −𝑊 − 0 0 + 𝑅 
𝑤4 f f −𝑊 + 0 0 − 𝑊 
 
Thus, 
(EU5) Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP6) 
Thus, if ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, and 𝐵 ⊭cl 𝐴, then we have an 
argument against believing 𝐴 and disbelieving 𝐵, and an argument against 
believing 𝐴 and suspending on 𝐵. Since belief, disbelief, and suspension are the 
only available categorical doxastic attitudes to a proposition, it seems at first sight 
that these two arguments then furnish us with a further argument that, if you 
believe 𝐴, and you adopt any categorical doxastic attitude towards 𝐵, then you 
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ought to believe 𝐵. But that’s not quite right.18 The problem is that, while 
arguments (EU4) and (EU5) establish flaws in believing 𝐴 and either suspending on 
𝐵 or disbelieving 𝐵, they do not rule out the possibility that believing 𝐴 and 
believing 𝐵 is also flawed in the same way. Now it turns out that, if 𝐴 is a 
contradiction then that is indeed the case. If 𝐴 is a contradiction, believing 𝐴 and 
believing 𝐵 is strictly logically dominated by disbelieving 𝐴 and believing 𝐵. 
However, if 𝐴 is not a contradiction, then believing 𝐴 and believing 𝐵 is not even 
weakly logically dominated.19 Thus, we have an argument for: 
(BP7) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, and 𝐵 ⊭cl 𝐴, and 𝐴 is not a classical 
contradiction, then you ought to see to it that, if you believe 𝐴, and you entertain 
𝐵, then you believe 𝐵. 
The argument: 
(EU6) Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP7) 
(BP7) doesn’t say that you ought to see to it that you believe 𝐵 if you believe 
𝐴. Rather, it says that you ought to see to it that, if 𝐵 is a proposition that you 
entertain and to which you assign an attitude at all, then you believe 𝐵 if you 
believe 𝐴. It does this by showing that it would be irrational to assign either of the 
alternative attitudes to 𝐵 in a way that it wouldn’t be irrational to believe 𝐵. This is 
as close as we can get to the principle that MacFarlane calls (Wo+). 
The upshot of this section is that, when the logic is classical and the 
entailment is a strict single premise entailment, epistemic utility considerations 
vindicate the logic-rationality bridge principles that seem most natural. They 
justify the wide scope versions of the norms, and they justify the versions with 
negative polarity. So they support bridge principles that are not vulnerable to some 
of Harman’s main criticisms. They are not excessively demanding, since they do 
not demand that an agent have any attitude at all towards 𝐵; rather, they only say 
what she should do if she does have an attitude towards 𝐵. And they posit wide 
scope norms, so they are not vulnerable to Harman’s objection that narrow scope 
norms arbitrarily favour one way of resolving an inconsistency in your beliefs. 
Multi-Premise Entailments 
Next, let’s see what happens when we include more premises. It turns out that the 
answer depends on the values of 𝑅 and 𝑊. In this section, we’ll have cause to refer 
to three different belief functions. Again, we define them now for ease of 
                                                        
18 Thanks to Anandi Hattiangadi on this point. 
19 No alternative does as well when 𝐴 and 𝐵 are both true. 
Richard Pettigrew 
468 
reference: 
 
 𝐴1 … 𝐴𝑛 𝐵  
𝑏3 B … B D 
𝑏4 B … B S 
𝑏⋄ S … S S 
 
Suppose ⊨cl governs 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵. Now, we might say 
that an assignment of epistemic utility is extremely conservative if 𝑛𝑅 < 𝑊. Then, 
assuming Extreme Epistemic Conservatism, 𝑏3 is strictly logically dominated by 𝑏
⋄ 
relative to EU. After all, 𝑏⋄ has exactly the same epistemic utility at every world—
namely, 0—while 𝑏3 performs best when 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 are all true, but 𝐵 is false, and 
in that situation 𝑏3 has epistemic utility 𝑛𝑅 − 𝑊, which by hypothesis is less than 
0. Thus, we have an epistemic utility argument for the following bridge principle: 
(BP8) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵, then you ought not to 
believe each of 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 while disbelieving 𝐵. 
This is the multi-premise analogue of (BP4) and MacFarlane’s (Wo-). Here’s 
the argument: 
(EU7) Extreme Epistemic Conservatism + Strict Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP8) 
(EU7) rules out 𝑏3 as irrational. Interestingly, we cannot strengthen this 
argument to rule out 𝑏4 as irrational as well. That is, we cannot give an argument 
for 
(BP9) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵, then you ought not to 
believe each of 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 while suspending judgment in 𝐵. 
Indeed, for any number of premises 𝑛, and any values 𝑅, 𝑊 for the goodness 
of getting things right and the badness of getting things wrong, respectively, there 
are classical propositions 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵 such that 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵, and such that the 
belief function 𝑏4 is not dominated. Indeed, there is always a regular probability 
function 𝑝 that expects the belief function 𝑏4 to have the highest epistemic utility 
of all possible belief functions defined on 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵.20 And this is sufficient to 
show that 𝑏4 is not weakly logically dominated.21 
                                                        
20A probability function is regular if it assigns strictly positive credence to every possibility. 
21Let’s see why this is so. Suppose that one option 𝑜∗ strictly logically dominates another 𝑜. Then 
𝑜∗ has strictly greater expected utility than 𝑜 by the lights of any probability function. After all, 
the utility of 𝑜∗ is greater than the utility of 𝑜 at every world. So any weighted sum of the 
utilities of 𝑜∗ will be greater than the corresponding weighted sum of the utilities of 𝑜. And of 
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Given how useful it is to know that a belief function maximises expected 
epistemic utility relative to a probability function, let’s spell out exactly how this 
works. The expected epistemic utility of a belief function 𝑏 by the lights of 
probability function 𝑝 is defined as follows: 
ExpEU(𝑏 ∣ 𝑝) = ∑ 𝑝
𝑤
(𝑤)EU(𝑏, 𝑤) 
It is straightforward to see that: 
ExpEU(𝑏 ∣ 𝑝) = ∑ 𝑝
𝑤
(𝑤)EU(𝑏, 𝑤)
= ∑ 𝑝
𝑤
(𝑤) ∑ eu
𝑋∈ℱ
(𝑤(𝑋), 𝑏(𝑋))
= ∑ ∑ 𝑝
𝑤𝑋∈ℱ
(𝑤)eu(𝑤(𝑋), 𝑏(𝑋))
= ∑ 𝑝
𝑋∈ℱ
(𝑋)eu(𝐭, 𝑏(𝑋)) + 𝑝(𝑋)eu(𝐟, 𝑏(𝑋))
 
That is, the expected utility of 𝑏 is the sum of the expected utilities of the 
individual attitudes it assigns. Thus, 𝑏 has maximal expected epistemic utility by 
the lights of 𝑝 iff each attitude that 𝑏 assigns has maximal expected epistemic 
utility by the lights of 𝑝. 
Now, note the following fact: 
Theorem 1 (Hempel-Easwaran-Dorst) 
If 𝑊 ≥ 𝑅, then 
i. belief in 𝑋 has maximal expected EU by the lights of 𝑝 if 1 ≥ 𝑝(𝑋) ≥
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
 
                                                                                                                      
course the expected utilities of 𝑜 and 𝑜∗ are just such weighted sums. Thus, if 𝑜 maximises 
expected utility by the lights of some probability function, there is no option that strictly 
logically dominates 𝑜, for such an option would have strictly greater expected utility by the 
lights of that probability function. Next, suppose that 𝑜∗ weakly logically dominates 𝑜. Then the 
utility of 𝑜∗ is at least the utility of 𝑜 at every world and strictly greater at some. So any weighted 
sum of the utilities of 𝑜∗ that assigns strictly positive weight to each will be greater than the 
corresponding weighted sum of the utilities of 𝑜. And again the expected utilities of 𝑜 and 𝑜∗ by 
the lights of a regular probability function are just such weighted sums. Thus, if 𝑜 maximises 
expected utility by the lights of some regular probability function, there is no option that weakly 
logically dominates 𝑜, for such an option would have strictly greater expected utility by the 
lights of that probability function. 
Richard Pettigrew 
470 
ii. suspension in 𝑋 has maximal expected EU by the lights of 𝑝 if 
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
≥
𝑝(𝑋) ≥
𝑅
𝑊+𝑅
 
iii. disbelief in 𝑋 has maximal expected EU by the lights of 𝑝 if 
𝑅
𝑊+𝑅
≥
𝑝(𝑋) ≥ 0. 
If 𝑊 < 𝑅, then 
i. belief in 𝑋 has maximal expected EU by the lights of 𝑝 if 1 ≥ 𝑝(𝑋) ≥
1
2
 
ii. suspension in 𝑋 never maximises expected EU by the lights of 𝑝 
iii. disbelief in 𝑋 has maximal expected EU by the lights of 𝑝 if  
1
2
≥ 𝑝(𝑋) ≥
0. 
It is in this sense that epistemic utility theory vindicates a normative reading 
of the Lockean thesis. Suppose 𝑊 ≥ 𝑅 — that is, you are an epistemic conservative 
or centrist. Then there is a threshold 𝑡 =
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
 such that you are rationally required 
to believe a proposition if your credence in that proposition exceeds 𝑡, you are 
rationally required to suspend on that proposition if your credence lies strictly 
between 1 − 𝑡 and 𝑡, and you are rationally required to disbelief it if you credence 
lies below 1 − 𝑡. If your credence is exactly 𝑡, then believing and suspending both 
maximise expected EU; if your credence is exactly 1 − 𝑡, then disbelieving and 
suspending both maximise expected EU. Next, suppose 𝑊 < 𝑅 — that is, you are 
an epistemic radical. Then there is a threshold 𝑡 =
1
2
= 1 − 𝑡 such that you are 
rationally required to believe a proposition if your credence in that proposition 
exceeds 𝑡, and you are rationally required to disbelief it if you credence lies below 
𝑡. If your credence is exactly 𝑡, then believing and disbelieving both maximise 
expected EU. 
Thus, given 𝑊 ≥ 𝑅, and 𝑛, in order to find propositions 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵 such 
that 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵 and a probability function by the lights of which 𝑏4(𝐴1) =
⋯ = 𝑏4(𝐴𝑛) = 𝐁 and 𝑏4(𝐵) = 𝐒 has maximal expected epistemic utility, we need 
only find 𝑝 such that 𝑝(𝐴1) = ⋯ = 𝑝(𝐴𝑛) ≥
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
 and 𝑝(𝐵) ≤
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
. And that is 
straightforward to do, since conjunctions typically have lower probability than 
their conjuncts.22 If 𝑊 < 𝑅, the situation is a little more complicated, since there is 
no probability function by the lights of which 𝑏4 has maximal expected utility, 
since there is no probability function for which suspending judgment has maximal 
                                                        
22 Let 𝑋 and 𝑌 be logically independent propositions. Let 𝐴1 = 𝑋 and 𝐴2 = ⋯ = 𝐴𝑛 = 𝑌, and 
𝐵 = 𝑋 & 𝑌. So 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵. Then let 𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌) =
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
 and 𝑝(𝑋𝑌 ∨ 𝑋𝑌) > 0. So 
𝑅
𝑊+𝑅
<
𝑝(𝑋 & 𝑌) <
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
. Thus, 𝑝(𝐴1) = ⋯ = 𝑝(𝐴𝑛) = 𝑡, while 1 − 𝑡 < 𝑝(𝐵) < 𝑡. 
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expected utility. But there are regular probability functions such that the only 
belief function that has higher expected epistemic utility than 𝑏4 assigns belief to 
each 𝐴𝑖 and assigns belief or disbelief to 𝐵; and it is easy to see that neither of those 
strictly or weakly dominates 𝑏4; so nothing does. So, unlike in the single-premise 
case, we cannot give a dominance argument for (BP9). 
Similar reasoning shows that, if we do not assume Extreme Epistemic 
Conservatism, then there is no guarantee even that 𝑏3 is weakly or strictly logically 
dominated. That is, we can find propositions 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and a probability 
function 𝑝 such that 𝑏3 has maximal expected epistemic utility by the lights of 𝑝. 
Here’s an example. Suppose there is a fair lottery with 𝑛 + 1 tickets. Let 𝐴𝑖 be 
proposition Ticket 𝑖 does not win, for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, and let 𝐵 be the proposition 
Ticket 𝑛 + 1 wins. Then 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 entail 𝐵. However, if we suppose that each 
ticket has the same chance of winning, then 𝑝(𝐴𝑖) =
𝑛
𝑛+1
≥
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
, for each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
𝑛, while 𝑝(𝐵) =
1
𝑛+1
≤
𝑅
𝑊+𝑅
.23 Thus, believing that each of the first 𝑛 tickets does 
not win whilst disbelieving that the final ticket will win is not strictly or weakly 
logically dominated. Indeed, not only is it not dominated, it is in fact the belief 
assignment recommended by the objective chance function in this context. 
The upshot of this section is that epistemic utility considerations vindicate 
intuitions such as the Preface Paradox, which entail that logical consistency is not 
a rational requirement on beliefs. If we care so much more about avoiding error 
than about believing truths, then we can recover the bridge principle that 
prohibits believing each of a set of propositions whilst disbelieving one of their 
classical logic consequences. But if we do not, we cannot. There will be situations, 
such as lottery or preface cases, in which such doxastic attitudes will be rationally 
required by the natural probability function that governs them. 
Non-Classical Logics 
Next, let’s look at what happens when we move from classical logic to a non-
classical alternative. We’ll focus on two particular non-classical logics: Kleene’s 
strong logic of indeterminacy (skl)  and Priest’s Logic of Paradox (lp) . Both have 
three truth values: {𝐭, 𝐮, 𝐟}. And both specify the same truth-functional definitions 
for the connectives, namely, 
 
 
 
                                                        
23Note: 
𝑛
𝑛+1
≥
𝑊
𝑊+𝑅
 iff 𝑛𝑅 ≤ 𝑊 iff 
1
𝑛+1
≤
𝑅
𝑊+𝑅
. 
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𝑋 𝑋  & t u f  ⋁ t u f 
t f  t t u f  t t t t 
u u  u u u f  u t u u 
f t  f f f f  f t u f 
 
They differ in the interpretation of the third truth value 𝐮. In strong Kleene 
logic it is taken to mean neither true nor false, while in Logic of Paradox, it is 
taken to mean both true and false. And they differ in the role that those truth 
values play in the definition of logical consequence for the two logics. In both 
logics, 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 entails 𝐵 iff whenever each of 𝐴1, …, 𝐴𝑛 takes one of the 
designated truth values, 𝐵 does as well. But they differ in the specification of the 
designated truth values. For Kleene’s logic, 𝐭 is the only designated truth value. For 
the Logic of Paradox, 𝐭 and 𝐮 are both designated. Thus, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐴 is not a tautology in 
strong Kleene logic, since it has truth value 𝐮 when 𝐴 does, and 𝐮 is not 
designated; but it is a tautology in Logic of Paradox, since it has value 𝐭 or 𝐮 
regardless of the truth value of 𝐴, and both are designated. 
Having introduced strong Kleene logic and Logic of Paradox, how might we 
define epistemic utility for belief functions when one of those logics governs the 
propositions that our agent entertains? It is easy to see what the possible worlds are 
in such a situation. They are the logically consistent valuation functions 𝑤: ℱ →
{𝐭, 𝐮, 𝐟}. And a local epistemic utility function is a function euskl/eulp: {𝐁, 𝐒, 𝐃} ×
{𝐭, 𝐮, 𝐟} → [−∞, ∞]. We assume that the local epistemic utility functions in these 
situations extend the classical ones, which specify the epistemic utility for 𝐁, 𝐒, 
and 𝐃 when the proposition towards which the attitude is directed takes truth 
value 𝐭 or 𝐟. Thus, we need only specify the epistemic value of each of these 
attitudes when directed towards a proposition with truth value 𝐮. 
Take strong Kleene logic first. Here, 𝐮 is interpreted to mean neither true 
nor false. We must define euskl(𝐮, 𝐁), euskl(𝐮, 𝐒), and euskl(𝐮, 𝐃). There are a 
number of views one might take on these values. These will depend in part on the 
use to which the logic is being put, but there will also be disagreements once we 
have fixed the use of the logic. I do not seek to adjudicate these disagreements 
here, but rather to spell out their consequences for the logic-rationality bridge 
principles. 
For instance, Hartry Field, following Kripke, claims that strong Kleene logic 
is the logic that governs the liar sentence.24 That is, the liar sentence takes truth 
value 𝐮; it is neither true nor false. What’s more, he takes the ideal attitude to 
                                                        
24 Hartry Field, Saving Truth from Paradox (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), Saul 
Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 72, 19 (1975): 690–716. 
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propositions with truth value 𝐮 to be disbelief (or rejection). Indeed, Michael Caie 
notes that this is the consensus amongst those who take a paracomplete approach 
to semantic paradoxes.25 Thus, for Field, the following is the natural assignment of 
epistemic value to the various categorical doxastic attitudes to a proposition with 
truth value 𝐮: 
eu(𝐭, 𝐁) = eu(𝐟, 𝐃) = eu(𝐮, 𝐃) = 𝑅
eu(𝐭, 𝐒) = eu(𝐟, 𝐒) = eu(𝐮, 𝐒) = 0
eu(𝐭, 𝐃) = eu(𝐟, 𝐁) = eu(𝐮, 𝐁) = −𝑊
 
Given this, we have a strict dominance argument for the strong Kleene 
version of (BP4) and weak dominance arguments for the strong Kleene versions of 
(BP5) and (BP6), which are obtained from those principles by replacing ⊨cl with 
⊨skl. In fact, this follows from a more general fact, which also covers the original, 
classical versions of (BP4-6):26 
Theorem 2 
Suppose: 
i. The logical consequence relation for a many-valued logic k is defined in 
terms of the preservation of designated truth values. 
ii. That is, 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨k 𝐵 iff, for all worlds 𝑤, if 𝑤(𝐴𝑖) is a designated 
truth value in k, for each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, then 𝑤(𝐵) is a designated truth 
value in k. 
iii. 𝐴 ⊨k 𝐵 
iv. If 𝐢 is a designated truth value, then eu(𝐢, 𝐁) =  𝑅, eu(𝐢, 𝐒) =
 0, eu(𝐢, 𝐃) =  −𝑊. 
v. If 𝐢 is not a designated truth value, then eu(𝐢, 𝐁) =  −𝑊, eu(𝐢, 𝐒) =
 0, eu(𝐢, 𝐃) =  𝑅. 
Then: 
a. If Epistemic Conservatism holds, then believing 𝐴 and disbelieving 𝐵 is 
strictly logically dominated by suspending on 𝐴 and suspending on 𝐵. 
                                                        
25 Michael Caie, “Belief and Indeterminacy,” Philosophical Review 121, 1 (2012): 1–54. 
26 Proof. The proof is easily adapted from the classical case. In that case, there were three 
possibilities: worlds at which 𝐴 and 𝐵 both take value 𝐭, worlds at which 𝐴 takes 𝐟 while 𝐵 takes 
𝐭, and worlds at which 𝐴 and 𝐵 both take value 𝐟. In the present case, the worlds can also be 
divided into three groups: worlds at which 𝐴 and 𝐵 both take a designated value, worlds at 
which 𝐴 takes an undesignated value and 𝐵 takes a designated value, and worlds at which 𝐴 and 
𝐵 both take an undesignated truth value. Because of (iii) and (iv), 𝑏1, 𝑏1
†, etc. have the same 
epistemic values at each of these three possibilities as they have at the corresponding possibility 
in the classical case. Thus, the reasoning in the classical case transfers to this case. QED. 
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b. That is, 𝑏1 is strictly logically dominated by 𝑏
∗ 
c. Believing 𝐴 and disbelieving 𝐵 is weakly logically dominated by 
disbelieving 𝐴 and believing 𝐵. That is, 𝑏1 is weakly logically dominated 
by 𝑏1
†. 
Believing 𝐴 and suspending on 𝐵 is weakly logically dominated by 
disbelieving 𝐴 and suspending on 𝐵. 
That is, 𝑏2 is weakly logically dominated by 𝑏2
†. 
We can also apply this in the case of the Logic of Paradox, if we follow 
Priest’s claim that belief (or acceptance) is the correct attitude to a proposition that 
is assigned truth value 𝐮, which he interprets as both true and false.27 In that case, 
the natural account of local epistemic utility is this: 
eu(𝐭, 𝐁) = eu(𝐟, 𝐃) = eu(𝐮, 𝐁) = 𝑅
eu(𝐭, 𝐒) = eu(𝐟, 𝐒) = eu(𝐮, 𝐒) = 0
eu(𝐭, 𝐃) = eu(𝐟, 𝐁) = eu(𝐮, 𝐃) = −𝑊
 
And, since 𝐮 is a designated truth value in Logic of Paradox, this account 
satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2. Thus, we have a strict dominance argument 
for the Logic of Paradox version of (BP4) and weak dominance arguments for the 
Logic of Paradox versions of (BP5) and (BP6), which are obtained from those 
principles by replacing ⊨cl with ⊨lp. 
However, there are other ways in which strong Kleene logic and Logic of 
Paradox may be applied for which the local epistemic utility functions described so 
far are not appropriate.28 Suppose, for instance, that strong Kleene logic governs 
propositions that involve vague predicates.29 Then the appropriate doxastic attitude 
to a proposition with truth value 𝐮 is surely suspension, not disbelief. If the colour 
of my socks lies in the borderline region between determinately red and 
determinately orange, it seems better to suspend judgment on the proposition My 
handkerchief is red than to believe or disbelieve it. Thus, we might think that the 
local epistemic utilities are assigned as follows: 
                                                        
27Graham Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
28 Thanks to Hartry Field, Patrick Greenough, and Ole Thomassen Hjortland for helpful 
discussion on this point. 
29 See, for instance: Michael Tye, “Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness,” in 
Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language, vol. 8, ed. James Tomberlin (Atascadero: 
Ridgeview Press, 2008), 189–208, Hartry Field, “No Fact of the Matter,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 81 (2003): 457–480. 
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eu(𝐭, 𝐁) = eu(𝐟, 𝐃) = 𝑅
eu(𝐮, 𝐒) = 𝑁
eu(𝐭, 𝐒) = eu(𝐟, 𝐒) = 0
eu(𝐮, 𝐁) = eu(𝐮, 𝐃) = −𝑍
eu(𝐭, 𝐃) = eu(𝐟, 𝐁) = −𝑊
 
where −𝑊 ≤ −𝑍 < 0 < 𝑁 ≤ 𝑅. In this case, under certain assumptions, we can 
again argue for strong Kleene versions of (BP4-6). After all, consider the truth 
table: 
 
 𝐴 𝐵 EU(𝑏1, 𝑤) EU(𝑏
∗, 𝑤) EU(𝑏1
†, 𝑤) EU(𝑏2, 𝑤) EU(𝑏2
†, 𝑤) 
𝑤1 𝐭 𝐭 𝑅 − 𝑊 0 + 0 −𝑊 + 𝑅 𝑅 + 0 0 + 𝑅 
𝑤2 𝐭 𝐮 𝑅 − 𝑍 0 + 𝑁 −𝑊 − 𝑍 𝑅 + 𝑁 0 − 𝑍 
𝑤3 𝐭 𝐟 𝑅 + 𝑅 0 + 0 −𝑊 − 𝑊 𝑅 + 0 0 − 𝑊 
𝑤4 𝐮 𝐭 −𝑍 − 𝑊 𝑁 + 0 −𝑍 + 𝑅 −𝑍 + 0 𝑁 + 𝑅 
𝑤5 𝐮 𝐮 −𝑍 − 𝑍 𝑁 + 𝑁 −𝑍 − 𝑍 −𝑍 + 𝑁 𝑁 − 𝑍 
𝑤6 𝐮 𝐟 −𝑍 + 𝑅 𝑁 + 0 −𝑍 − 𝑊 −𝑍 + 0 𝑁 − 𝑊 
𝑤7 𝐟 𝐭 −𝑊 − 𝑊 0 + 0 𝑅 + 𝑅 −𝑊 + 0 0 + 𝑅 
𝑤8 𝐟 𝐮 −𝑊 − 𝑍 0 + 𝑁 𝑅 − 𝑍 −𝑊 + 𝑁 0 − 𝑍 
𝑤9 𝐟 𝐟 −𝑊 + 𝑅 0 + 0 𝑅 − 𝑊 −𝑊 + 0 0 − 𝑊 
 
If 𝐴 ⊨skl 𝐵, then 𝑤2 and 𝑤3 do not represent logical possibilities, but the rest do. 
Thus: 
 If 𝑁 + 𝑍 > 𝑅 and 𝑊 ≥ 𝑅, 𝑏1 is weakly logically dominated by 𝑏
∗. 
 Even if 𝑁 + 𝑍 > 𝑅 and 𝑊 ≥ 𝑅, 𝑏1 is not even weakly logically 
dominated by 𝑏1
†. 
 After all, 𝑏1 outperforms 𝑏1
† when 𝐴 has truth value 𝐮 and 𝐵 has truth 
value 𝐟. And indeed there are values of 𝑊 ≥ 𝑍 and 𝑁 ≤ 𝑅 such that 
nothing even weakly logically dominates 𝑏1 for those values. 
 If 𝑊 − 𝑍 = 𝑁, 𝑏2 is weakly logically dominated by 𝑏2
†. 
Thus, we have arguments for the strong Kleene versions of (BP4-6), which 
are obtained from those principles by replacing ⊨cl with ⊨skl. But those arguments 
are weaker than the corresponding arguments for the original, classical versions of 
(BP4-6), since they make stronger assumptions about local epistemic utilities: 
(EU8) (𝑁 + 𝑍 > 𝑅) + (𝑊 ≥ 𝑅) + Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP4 skl) and 
(BP5 skl). 
(EU9) (𝑊 + 𝑍 = 𝑁) + Weak Logical Dominance ⇒ (BP6 skl). 
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Next, suppose that the Logic of Paradox governs future contingents.30 Thus, 
the truth value of a future contingent 𝑋 is: (i) 𝐭 if 𝑋 is true in all possible futures; 
(ii) 𝐟 is 𝑋 is false in all possible futures; and (iii) 𝐮 if 𝑋 is true in some futures and 
false in others. The idea is that, in the latter case, the proposition is both true at 
some point in the future and false at some point in the future, and thus both true 
and false now. This is a paraconsistent approach to the logic of future contingents. 
In this situation, we might think it natural to order the local epistemic utilities of 
the various categorical doxastic attitudes as follows: 
eu(𝐭, 𝐁) = eu(𝐟, 𝐃) = 𝑅
eu(𝐮, 𝐁) = eu(𝐮, 𝐃) = 𝑁
eu(𝐭, 𝐒) = eu(𝐟, 𝐒) = 0
eu(𝐮, 𝐒) = −𝑍
eu(𝐭, 𝐃) = eu(𝐟, 𝐁) = −𝑊
 
where −𝑊 ≤ −𝑍 < 0 < 𝑁 ≤ 𝑅. If we do this, here’s the truth table:  
 
 𝐴 𝐵 EU(𝑏1, 𝑤) EU(𝑏
∗, 𝑤) EU(𝑏1
†, 𝑤) EU(𝑏2, 𝑤) EU(𝑏2
†, 𝑤) 
𝑤1 𝐭 𝐭 𝑅 − 𝑊 0 + 0 −𝑊 + 𝑅 𝑅 + 0 0 + 𝑅 
𝑤2 𝐭 𝐮 𝑅 + 𝑁 0 − 𝑍 −𝑊 + 𝑁 𝑅 − 𝑍 0 + 𝑁 
𝑤3 𝐭 𝐟 𝑅 + 𝑅 0 + 0 −𝑊 − 𝑊 𝑅 + 0 0 − 𝑊 
𝑤4 𝐮 𝐭 𝑁 − 𝑊 −𝑍 + 0 𝑁 + 𝑅 𝑁 + 0 −𝑍 + 𝑅 
𝑤5 𝐮 𝐮 𝑁 + 𝑁 −𝑍 − 𝑍 𝑁 + 𝑁 𝑁 − 𝑍 −𝑍 + 𝑁 
𝑤6 𝐮 𝐟 𝑁 + 𝑅 −𝑍 + 0 𝑁 − 𝑊 𝑁 + 0 −𝑍 − 𝑊 
𝑤7 𝐟 𝐭 −𝑊 − 𝑊 0 + 0 𝑅 + 𝑅 −𝑊 + 0 0 + 𝑅 
𝑤8 𝐟 𝐮 −𝑊 + 𝑁 0 − 𝑍 𝑅 + 𝑁 −𝑊 − 𝑍 0 + 𝑁 
𝑤9 𝐟 𝐟 −𝑊 + 𝑅 0 + 0 𝑅 − 𝑊 −𝑊 + 0 0 − 𝑊 
 
If 𝐴 ⊨lp 𝐵, then worlds 𝑤3 and 𝑤6 fail to represent logical possibilities. But 
given this, we can see that no alternative weakly or strictly dominates 𝑏1. The 
reason is that no alternative belief function performs as well as 𝑏1 at world 𝑤2. 
Similarly, no alternative either weakly or strictly dominates 𝑏2. The only 
alternatives that perform as well as 𝑏2 at 𝑤2 assign 𝐁 to 𝐴 and either 𝐁 or 𝐃 to 𝐵; 
but these perform worse than 𝑏2 at worlds 𝑤9 and 𝑤7, respectively. So we do not 
have an Logic of Paradox versions of (BP4-6) in this case. 
Indeed, this all follows from a more general fact:31 
                                                        
30 Roberto Ciuni and Carlo Proietti, “The Abundance of the Future: A Paraconsistent Approach 
to Future Contingents,” Logic and Logical Philosophy 22, 1 (2013): 21–43. 
31 Proof.  The truth value i from (4) is either designated or undesignated. Suppose first that it is 
designated. Then the only alternative belief function that performs at least as well as 𝑏1 at the 
logical possibility where 𝐴 takes 𝐭 and 𝐵 takes i is the belief function that assigns belief to 𝐴 and 
belief to 𝐵. But that performs worse than 𝑏1 when 𝐴 and 𝐵 both take 𝐟. Next, suppose that it is 
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Theorem 3 
Suppose: 
i. The logical consequence relation for a many-valued logic k is defined in 
terms of the preservation of designated truth values. 
ii. 𝐴 ⊨k 𝐵 
iii. euk extends eucl. 
iv. There is a truth value i such that 
v. −𝑊 ≤ euk(𝐢, 𝐒) <  euk(𝐢, 𝐁) =  euk(𝐢, 𝐃)  ≤ 𝑅 
Then: 
a. No alternative even weakly logically dominates believing 𝐴 and 
disbelieving 𝐵. 
That is, nothing weakly dominates 𝑏1. 
The upshot of this section is that the fate of logic-rationality bridge 
principles is sensitive to the logic that governs the propositions in question, the 
interpretation of the truth values in that logic, and the resulting assignments of 
epistemic value to beliefs, disbeliefs, and suspensions in propositions that take 
truth-values other than 𝐭 or 𝐟. This explains why we have been careful throughout 
to specify in the antecedent of those principles which logic governs the 
propositions in question. There are bridge principles that hold when the logic is 
classical that do not hold for alternative logics. 
Logical, Doxastic, and Epistemic Possibilities 
In the preceding sections, we have offered epistemic utility arguments in favour of 
certain logic-rationality bridge principles, and we have given epistemic utility-
based reasons for doubting that others can be justified. For each of the bridge 
principles we have considered, its antecedent is a plain fact about logical 
consequence—something of the form ⊨k governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨k 𝐵 
for some logic k and some 𝑛 ≥ 1. As a result, the principles are quite demanding. 
They require that you manage your beliefs in line with a logical fact that you 
might not know or even believe. We have been able to justify these demanding 
principles only because we’ve assumed similarly demanding principles of decision 
theory. For instance, Strict Logical Dominance says that an option is irrational if 
                                                                                                                      
undesignated. Then the only belief function that performs at least as well as 𝑏1 at the logical 
possibility where 𝐴 takes i and 𝐵 takes 𝐟 is the belief function that assigns disbelief to 𝐴 and 
disbelief to 𝐵. But that performs worse than 𝑏1 when 𝐴 and 𝐵 both take 𝐭. QED. 
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there is an alternative that is better at all logically possible worlds; Weak Logical 
Dominance says that an option is irrational if there is an alternative that is at least 
as good at all logically possible worlds, and better at some. And you might think 
that these are too strong, even in the practical case. For instance, Strict and Weak 
Logical Dominance render it irrational for my nine year old niece to pay any 
positive amount for a bet against Fermat’s Last Theorem, even if she has never 
heard of it until I describe it to her, and even if I tell her nothing about its proof 
status. If we weaken these decision-theoretic principles, we obtain epistemic utility 
arguments for the correspondingly weakened logic-rational bridge principles. 
Here are general versions of our dominance norms, where 𝒞 is a set of 
worlds. 
Strict 𝒞 Dominance  If option 𝑜∗ has greater utility than option 𝑜 at every world 
in 𝒞, then 𝑜 is irrational. 
Weak 𝒞 Dominance  If option 𝑜∗ has at least as great utility as option 𝑜 at every 
world in 𝒞, and greater utility at some, then 𝑜 is irrational. 
We obtain Strict/Weak Logical Dominance if 𝒞 is the set of logically possible 
worlds. We obtain Strict/Weak Doxastic Dominance if 𝒞 is the set of doxastically 
possible worlds—that is, the worlds at which everything she believes is true and 
everything she disbelieves is false. And we obtain Strict/Weak Epistemic 
Dominance if 𝒞 is the set of epistemically possible worlds—that is, the worlds 
compatible with what the agent knows. And so on. 
Now, suppose we replace Strict/Weak Logical Dominance with Strict/Weak 
Doxastic or Epistemic Dominance in our arguments for logic-rationality bridge 
principles. Then surely we obtain arguments for the corresponding bridge 
principles in which the antecedent is no longer just a proposition about logical 
consequence, but is rather the proposition that the agent believes or knows that 
proposition about logical consequence.32 
Thus, for instance, let’s assume Weak Doxastic Dominance: 
Weak Doxastic Dominance If option 𝑜∗ has at least as great utility as option 𝑜 at 
every doxastically possible world, and greater utility at some, then 𝑜 is irrational. 
Then, in order to adapt argument (EU2), we need to assume that the agent 
believes that classical logic is the correct logic and that 𝐴 is strictly stronger than 𝐵 
in that logic. By believing that classical logic is the correct logic, our agent narrows 
down the set of doxastically possible worlds to the four—𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, 𝑤4—
represented in the relevant table above; by also believing that 𝐴 is strictly stronger 
                                                        
32 J. R. G. Williams, “Rational Illogicality” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). 
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than 𝐵, our agent narrows the field further by ruling out world 𝑤2 at which 𝐴 is 
true and 𝐵 is false, but retains world 𝑤3 at which 𝐴 is false and 𝐵 is true—that is, 
she narrows the field to 𝑤1, 𝑤3, 𝑤4. We thus obtain: 
(BP10) If you believe that ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, and 𝐵 ⊭cl 𝐴, then 
you ought not to believe 𝐴 while disbelieving in 𝐵. 
Or so it seems. The problem with using doxastic possibility in this context is 
that we are using facts about what we believe to delimit the set of worlds that 
feature in a dominance principle that we then use to choose our beliefs! Why 
might this be problematic? Initially, you might think that it could give rise to a sort 
of instability in the beliefs it is rational for you to have. You start with a set of 
beliefs. They determine the worlds that are doxastically possible for you. 
Determined in this way, it turns out that epistemic utility theory rules out your 
beliefs as irrational. So you pick another set of beliefs. They determine the worlds 
that are doxastically possible for you. Determined in this way, it turns out that 
epistemic utility theory rules out those beliefs as irrational. And so on. At first 
sight, this seems a possibility. But, in fact, it is the opposite that happens. Pick a set 
of consistent beliefs and disbeliefs. These then determine a set of doxastically 
possible worlds. At each of these worlds, each of the beliefs you picked is true and 
each of the disbeliefs you picked is false. Thus, you have maximal epistemic utility 
at each of these worlds. Any alternative assignment of beliefs, suspensions, and 
disbeliefs to the same propositions will be weakly doxastically dominated. Thus, 
any consistent set of beliefs renders itself the only rational option. 
Here’s another way in which it might be problematic to use beliefs to 
determine the doxastic possibilities, and then use those possibilities to pick the 
beliefs. Suppose I believe that 𝐴 entails 𝐵, and I believe 𝐴, but I disbelieve 𝐵. Then 
there are no worlds at which all of my beliefs are true and all my disbeliefs false. 
Thus, there are no worlds that are doxastically possible for me. One consequence of 
that is that every belief function is strictly doxastically dominated by every other 
one — for every pair of belief functions 𝑏 and 𝑏ʹ on the same set of propositions, it 
is vacuously true that 𝑏 is strictly better than 𝑏ʹ at all doxastically possible worlds, 
for there are no doxastically possible worlds. Thus, unless we restrict Strict 
Doxastic Dominance, every belief function is irrational. In fact, we’re best to 
restrict Strict Doxastic Dominance in this case, and say that dominance principles 
only apply when the relevant set of worlds is non-empty. But if we do this, 
nothing is ruled irrational for the agent who believes that 𝐴 entails 𝐵, believes 𝐴, 
and disbelieves 𝐵. And that looks troubling too! 
A final worry about moving to Strict/Weak Doxastic Dominance principles. 
The norms that result from the epistemic utility arguments that appeal to those 
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principles are narrow scope norms of the sort that we typically reject in this area. 
Consider the standard narrow scope norm in this area: if you believe If 𝐴, then 𝐵, 
and you believe that 𝐴, then you ought to believe that 𝐵. As Harman noted in 
Change in View, such a norm cannot be correct, since it is just as legitimate to 
respond by dropping your belief that If 𝐴, then 𝐵 or by dropping your belief that 𝐴 
as it is to respond by keeping both of those beliefs and further adopting a belief 
that 𝐵. Similarly, surely the logic-rationality bridge principles that follow from the 
doxastic dominance arguments cannot be correct either. Surely it is just as 
legitimate to respond to your belief that 𝐴 and 𝐵 are governed by ⊨cl and your 
belief that 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵 by dropping one or other or both of those beliefs as it is to 
retain both beliefs and then ensure that you do not believe 𝐴 and disbelieve 𝐵. 
I offer two different solutions to these problems. First, the Two-Tier 
Solution. We might save our new doxastic dominance arguments for the doxastic 
versions of the bridge principles if we take our beliefs about logical consequence to 
be of a rather different sort from our beliefs about other matters. We might take 
the beliefs about logical consequence to delimit the doxastically possible worlds, 
perhaps, and then use those in our dominance principles to assess the different 
possible sets of beliefs we might have towards other propositions. If you opt for this 
solution, you owe an account of why there are two sorts of beliefs, ones that get to 
delimit doxastic possibilities and ones that don’t. And you have to say, in 
particular, why logical beliefs—beliefs about the logic that governs a class of 
propositions, and beliefs about the consequence relation of that logic—are of the 
former sort. You might appeal, for instance, to Quine’s notion of a web of belief.33 
It is perhaps the propositions sufficiently close to the centre of our web of belief—
that is, those least vulnerable to revision—that delimit the set of doxastic 
possibilities. It is then those further out—those more vulnerable to revision—that 
are governed by Strict/Weak Doxastic Dominance. This would provide a principled 
distinction between the two sorts of belief, and it would also explain why the 
narrow scope norm is appropriate. It explains why it is legitimate to demand that 
you respond to your logical belief that 𝐴 and 𝐵 are governed by ⊨cl and your 
logical belief that 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵 by ensuring that you do not believe 𝐴 and disbelieve 𝐵, 
rather than by dropping one or other or both of your logical beliefs. The 
explanation is that the logical beliefs lie closer to the centre of the web of belief—
when something’s got to give, it shouldn’t be them. 
Here’s the second solution to the problems raised above for the doxastic 
dominance arguments for the doxastic versions of the logic-rationality bridge 
                                                        
33 W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review 60, 1 (1951): 20–43. W. 
V. O. Quine and Joe Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970). 
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principles we’ve been considering. We might call it the Wide Scope solution. It 
proceeds by analogy with the standard retreat from narrow to wide scope norms in 
the face of Harman’s criticism. Thus, instead of trying to justify the narrow scope 
norm (BP10), we might try to justify the wide scope version of it: 
(BP11) You ought to see to it that you don’t believe that ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵, 
believe 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, believe 𝐵 ⊭ 𝐴, believe 𝐴, but disbelieve 𝐵. 
Can we offer an epistemic utility argument for (BP11)? We have five 
propositions in play: (i) ⊨cl governs 𝐴 and 𝐵; (ii) 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵; (iii) 𝐵 ⊭cl 𝐴; (iv) 𝐴; and 
(v) 𝐵. (BP11) says that you ought not to believe (i)-(iv) whilst disbelieving (v). But 
now notice that (i)-(iv) entail (v). So, we have a multi-premise entailment and we 
wish to justify a norm that prohibits believing the premises and disbelieving the 
conclusion. Thus, if we simply treat each of these propositions as a normal 
proposition, and if it is legitimate to assume that any agent can see the entailment 
from (i)-(iv) to (v), and that is something they should never give up, then we can 
simply turn our Strict Logical Dominance argument for (BP8) into a Strict Doxastic 
Dominance argument for (BP11). Now, notice that the multi-premise entailment 
in question is a four-premise entailment. So in order to run our dominance 
argument for it, we need to assume a version of Extreme Epistemic Conservatism, 
namely, that 4𝑅 < 𝑊. But if we have that, then we can conclude (BP11). 
Thus, we have two putative solutions to our problems. On the Two-Tier 
solution, we retain the narrow scope norm (BP10) by saying that some 
propositions—including those that pertain to the correct logic and the 
consequence relation of that logic—fix the doxastic possibilities, while others are 
determined after those possibilities have been fixed by considerations of epistemic 
utility. On the Wide Scope solution, we do not assign the logical propositions any 
special role, and instead treat them just like other propositions, giving us the wide 
scope version (BP11). 
So much for our solutions to the problems raised above. In the remainder of 
this section, we make a handful of further observations on the move from logic-
rationality bridge principles with purely logical antecedents to the versions with 
doxastic antecedents. First, we note that there are two ways in which you might 
not know or believe all the logical truths. You might know what the correct logic 
is—for instance, you might know that classical logic governs 𝐴 and 𝐵—but you 
might not know that 𝐴 entails 𝐵 within that logic. But you might not even know 
what the correct logic is—you might not know whether strong Kleene logic, 
classical logic, or Logic of Paradox governs 𝐴 and 𝐵. Above, we focussed on the 
first sort of case, assuming that there was some particular logic that our agents 
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believed to be the correct one. But there are some things to say about the second 
case as well. 
Suppose, for instance, that our agent believes that the correct logic is either 
strong Kleene logic or classical logic; suppose she knows that 𝐴 entails 𝐵; and 
suppose 𝑁 + 𝑍 > 𝑅 and 𝑊 ≥ 𝑅; then it would be irrational for her to believe 𝐴 and 
disbelieve 𝐵—that is, irrational for her to have belief function 𝑏1. After all, if we 
pool all of the worlds that are possible relative to classical logic and all of the 
worlds that are possible relative to strong Kleene logic, then 𝑏∗ dominates 𝑏1. The 
reason is that every classically possible world is also logically possible from the 
point of view of strong Kleene logic. Thus, since 𝑏∗ dominates 𝑏1 relative to the 
strong Kleene worlds, it dominates 𝑏1 relative to all the strong Kleene and classical 
worlds. 
That might tempt us to think that if a logic-rationality bridge principle can 
be justified by logical dominance reasoning relative to one logic and justified by 
logical dominance reasoning also relative to another logic, then it can be justified 
by doxastic dominance reasoning for someone who believes that one or other of 
these logics is correct, but isn’t certain which. But that is not the case. The reason: 
it might be that a belief function 𝑏 is dominated by 𝑏ʹ and not by 𝑏ʺ relative to the 
first logic, while it is dominated by 𝑏ʺ and not by 𝑏ʹ relative to the second. In that 
case, neither 𝑏ʹ nor 𝑏ʺ dominates 𝑏 relative to the disjunction of the logics. In this 
case, we have a situation akin to the Miners Paradox.34 If the first logic is actual, 
the agent ought not to choose 𝑏 (since it is dominated by 𝑏ʹ); if the second logic is 
actual, the agent ought not to choose 𝑏 (since it is dominated by 𝑏ʺ); the first logic 
is actual or the second is; but it does not follow that the agent ought not to choose 
𝑏.35 
My next observation on logic-rationality bridge principles with doxastic 
antecedents concerns the argument due to MacFarlane that we should not be 
satisfied with them. The problem with these principles, MacFarlane argues, is this: 
if they are the strongest norms in the vicinity, it seems that the less you know, 
logically speaking, the less restricted are your beliefs; by remaining ignorant of 
logical facts, you are less likely to be irrational, since less stringent restrictions are 
placed upon you. And this seems counterintuitive. It seems to give an incentive to 
remain logically uninformed. But this should be nothing new. For many 
philosophers—subjectivist Bayesian epistemologists, for instance—the less 
evidence you have, whether logical or not, the fewer restrictions are placed upon 
you. But this only gives an incentive to remain uninformed if avoiding irrationality 
                                                        
34 Derek Parfit, “What We Together Do” (unpublished manuscript). 
35For a related discussion, see J. R. G. Williams, “Rational Illogicality.” 
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is the only thing you care about. And of course it is not. You also care about 
making good decisions and having accurate beliefs. In the case of non-logical facts, 
the value of learning theorem due to I. J. Good and Frank Ramsey shows that you 
can expect to make better decisions after you have learned those facts than 
before;36 and it is straightforward to adapt the epistemic utility-based argument for 
Conditionalization to show that you can expect to have more accurate beliefs after 
you learn non-logical facts than before.37 Now, there is no reason why these 
arguments shouldn’t apply to learning logical facts as well. Thus, we can take the 
doxastic versions of the logic-rationality bridge principles to be the strongest 
principles in the vicinity, whilst also thinking that agents should try to know as 
many logical facts as possible, and should then manage their beliefs in line with the 
logical facts that they believe. However, their reasons for doing so are just their 
usual reasons for learning, and then managing their beliefs in line with what 
they’ve learned. 
This leads us to our final point in this section. Given a particular logic-
rationality bridge principle, we can ask what role is played by the logicality of the 
fact about logical consequence that appears in the principle’s antecedent.38 Are 
there principles of rationality of the same form that feature a non-logical fact in 
the antecedent? Does the argument for the bridge principle pay any special 
attention to the logicality of the fact about logical consequence? The structure of 
the answer depends, I think, on whether you embrace the Two-Tier solution or 
the Wide Scope solution above; but the conclusion doesn’t. Whichever of those 
solutions you choose, the logicality of the logical facts plays no special role. Let’s 
see why. First, suppose you opt for the Two-Tier solution. That is, you say that 
there are two different roles that beliefs can play: they can circumscribe the set of 
doxastic possible worlds, and they can be evaluated for their epistemic utility. 
What’s more, you say that all logical beliefs play the first role, while some non-
logical beliefs play the second. But there is no reason to suppose that it is only the 
logical beliefs that can delimit the doxastically possible worlds. And, of course, if 
we spell out this solution by saying that it is beliefs near to the centre of the web of 
belief that play the delimiting role, then presumably beliefs concerning analytic or 
conceptual truths, mathematical truths, or metaphysical necessities will fit the bill 
                                                        
36 I. J. Good, “On the Principle of Total Evidence,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 17 (1967): 319–322, Frank P. Ramsey, “Weight or the Value of Knowledge,” The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1990): 1–4. 
37 Hilary Greaves and David Wallace, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization 
Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility,” Mind 115, 459 (2006): 607–632. 
38This question also runs through Harman, Change in View. 
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just as well as logical beliefs do. Thus, the logicality of the logical beliefs plays no 
special role—what is relevant is their location in the web of belief, and plenty of 
non-logical beliefs occupy nearby locales. Next, suppose you opt for the second 
solution to the problems outlined at the beginning of this section. Then the 
irrelevance of the logicality of those beliefs is even more stark. After all, on that 
solution, we justify the wide scope norm (BP11). But our argument for that appeals 
only to the obvious entailment from (i)-(iv) to (v) above. It does not appeal at any 
point to the logicality of (i)-(iii). The argument would run just as well if (i)-(iii) 
were any premises for which the entailment from those, together with (iv), to (v) is 
sufficiently obvious. Thus, on both solutions there is nothing about the logicality of 
the logic-rationality bridge principles that plays a role in our arguments. 
Bridge Principles for Partial Beliefs 
In the previous section, we asked what we can learn about logic-rationality bridge 
principles for categorical doxastic states, such as full belief, full disbelief, and 
suspension of judgment, by looking at the epistemic utility of those doxastic 
attitudes. In this section, we turn our attention to partial beliefs, or credences as we 
will call them. 
As before, we begin with the now-standard story about the classical case.39 
Suppose our agent has a credence function 𝑐 defined on a set of propositions ℱ. For 
each proposition 𝐴 in ℱ, 𝑐(𝐴) gives the agent’s credence in 𝐴. By convention, we 
take maximal credence to be 1 and minimal credence to be 0. Thus, 𝑐: ℱ → [0,1]. 
Now, as above, we must define an epistemic utility function EU that takes a 
credence function 𝑐 and a possible world 𝑤 and returns EU(𝑐, 𝑤), a measure of the 
epistemic utility of having credence function 𝑐 at world 𝑤. As above, we take it to 
be additive. That is, we assume that there is a local epistemic utility function 
eu: {𝐭, 𝐟} × [0,1] → [−∞, ∞] such that 
EU(𝑐, 𝑤) = ∑ eu
𝑋∈ℱ
(𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) 
How do we define eu? We do so in two steps. First, for each proposition 𝐴 
and each possible world 𝑤, we take there to be an ideal or perfect or vindicated 
credence in 𝐴 at 𝑤—we call this 𝑣𝑤(𝐴). Now, as in the case of categorical doxastic 
attitudes, the standard story in the credal case takes a veritist approach—that is, it 
assumes that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for doxastic states is 
                                                        
39 Joyce, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication,” Joyce, “Accuracy and Coherence,” Pettigrew, Accuracy 
and the Laws of Credence. 
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the accuracy with which they represent the world. In the classical case, this 
suggests: 
𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = {
1  if 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐭
0  if 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐟
 
We might call this assumption about the ideal credences Vindicated is 
Omniscient. 
Second, having defined the ideal credence in a given proposition at a given 
possible world, we can then define the epistemic utility of credence 𝑐(𝐴) at world 
𝑤 to be its proximity to 𝑣𝑤(𝐴). That is, the epistemic disutility of 𝑐(𝐴) at 𝑤 is the 
distance from 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) to 𝑐(𝐴). How are we to measure distance between credence 
functions? There are various arguments for measuring such distances using the so-
called Bregman divergences.40 A divergence is a function 𝔡 that takes a pair of real 
numbers 𝑥 and 𝑦 and returns 𝔡(𝑥, 𝑦), a non-negative real number or ∞. We say 
that 𝔡 is a divergence iff 𝔡(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 0 with equality iff 𝑥 = 𝑦. And we say that 𝔡 is a 
Bregman divergence if there is a strictly convex, continuously differentiable 
function 𝜑: [0,1] → [0, ∞) such that: 
𝔡(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝜑(𝑥) − 𝜑(𝑦) − 𝜑ʹ(𝑦)(𝑥 − 𝑦) 
where 𝜑ʹ is the derivative of 𝜑. That is, the divergence from 𝑥 to 𝑦 is the difference 
between the value at 𝑥 of 𝜑 and the value at 𝑥 of the tangent to 𝜑 taken at 𝑦. If eu 
is a local epistemic utility function, we demand that it is generated by a Bregman 
divergence 𝔡 as follows: 
eu(𝑤(𝐴), 𝑐(𝐴)) = −𝔡(𝑣𝑤(𝐴), 𝑐(𝐴)) 
That is, the epistemic utility of a credence 𝑐(𝐴) in proposition 𝐴 at world 𝑤 
is the negative of the divergence from 𝑣𝑤(𝐴), the ideal credence in 𝐴 at 𝑤, to 𝑐(𝐴). 
Putting all of this together, we have that 
EU(𝑐, 𝑤) = ∑ eu
𝑋∈ℱ
(𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) = − ∑ 𝔡
𝑋∈ℱ
(𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) 
A well known result shows that the epistemic utility functions defined in 
this way are precisely the so-called additive and continuous strictly proper 
inaccuracy measures. We might call this assumption about epistemic utility 
Bregman Divergence. 
                                                        
40 Joyce, “Accuracy and Coherence,” Pettigrew, Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, Benjamin 
Levinstein, “A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility,” Philosophy of Science (forthcoming), 
Sophie Horowitz, “Accuracy and Educated Guesses,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 
(forthcoming).  
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Now, it is natural to ask what logic-rationality bridge principles follow from 
this account of the epistemic utility of credences when we apply the decision-
theoretic principles that we considered above. The following is a well-known 
result:41 
Theorem 4 
Suppose: 
i. EU is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. 
That is, EU = ∑ eu𝑋∈ℱ (𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) = − ∑ 𝔡𝑋∈ℱ (𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)), where 𝔡 is a 
Bregman divergence. 
Then: 
a. If 𝑐 is not a probability function on ℱ, then there is a probability 
function 𝑐∗ on ℱ such that 𝑐∗ strictly logically dominates 𝑐 relative to 
EU—that is, EU(𝑐, 𝑤) < EU(𝑐∗, 𝑤), for all logically possible worlds 𝑤. 
Now, a probability function on ℱ is a credence function 𝑐 that satisfies the 
following conditions: 
(BP11a) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴, and ⊨cl 𝐴, then 𝑐(𝐴) = 1 
(BP11b) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴, and 𝐴 ⊨cl, then 𝑐(𝐴) = 0 
(BP12) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨cl 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴) ≤ 𝑐(𝐵) 
(BP13) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴, 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴 & 𝐵) + 𝑐(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵) = 𝑐(𝐴) + 𝑐(𝐵) 
The first three are logic-rationality bridge principles: they concern how 
credences should behave given facts about the consequence relation. The fourth is 
not: it concerns the interaction between credences in propositions of different 
logical forms. Williams calls (BP12) the No Drop principle. It is the credal analogue 
to principles like (Wo-) from MacFarlane42 and (BP4-7) from above. Thus, we have 
the following epistemic utility argument: 
(EU9) Bregman Divergence + Vindicated is Omniscient + Strict Logical 
Dominance ⇒ (BP11-13). 
Before we leave the classical case, it is worth sketching the proof of Theorem 
4, since that will show us how that proof might be adapted to the non-classical 
case. The proof is based on two lemmas. First: 
                                                        
41 Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, Vincent Poor, and Sanjeev 
Kulkarni, “Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules,” IEEE Transactions of Information 
Theory 55, 10 (2009): 4786–4792. 
42 MacFarlane, “In What Sense (If Any).” 
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Lemma 5 The set of probability functions is precisely the closed convex hull of the 
set of vindicated credence functions, 𝑣𝑤, for possible worlds 𝑤.43 
Second: 
Lemma 6 Suppose 𝔡 is a Bregman divergence, and 𝒳 ⊆ [0,1]𝑛 is a set of 𝑛-
dimensional vectors. Then, if 𝑧 is a point in [0,1]𝑛 that lies outside the closed 
convex hull of 𝒳, then there is a point 𝑧∗ inside the convex hull of 𝒳 such 
∑ 𝔡𝑛𝑖=1 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖
∗) < 𝔡(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) for all 𝑥 in 𝒳. 
Thus, suppose 𝑐 is a credence function that is not a probability function. 
Then, by Lemma 5, 𝑐 lies outside the closed convex hull of the vindicated credence 
functions. Then, by Lemma 6, there is 𝑐∗ in the convex hull of the vindicated 
credence functions such that 𝔡(𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐
∗(𝑋)) < 𝔡(𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)). And thus, 
EU(𝑐, 𝑤) < EU(𝑐∗, 𝑤), for all 𝑤. 
Breaking down the result into these two component parts allows us to see 
how it might be generalised. Suppose we move to a different logic. And, as a result, 
we take different credences to be vindicated—that is, we define 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) differently 
from how we defined it above. Suppose further that we continue to measure the 
local epistemic utility of a credence 𝑐(𝐴) as its proximity to the vindicated 
credence: that is, eu(𝑤(𝐴), 𝑐(𝐴)) = −𝔡(𝑣𝑤(𝐴), 𝑐(𝐴)). Then we can find the bridge 
principle for which strict dominance provides an epistemic utility argument as 
follows: 
First, we characterise the closed convex hull of those new vindicated 
credence functions—that is, we provide an analogue of Lemma 5. 
Second, we note that, if a credence function 𝑐 lies outside this closed convex 
hull, then there is an alternative 𝑐∗ that is closer to each of the vindicated credence 
functions than 𝑐, and thus epistemically better than 𝑐 at all logically possible 
worlds—that is, we deploy Lemma 6. 
We will see exactly this strategy in action below. 
Before we see it in action in the non-classical case, we first observe it in the 
classical case. We can use Lemma 6 to justify the following bridge principle, 
(BP14). (BP14) is the general bridge principle for credences that Field44 defends, 
drawing on Adams and Edgington45. 
                                                        
43 If 𝒳 is a set of credence functions, then its convex hull is the smallest convex set that contains 
𝒳; that is, the smallest set that contains 𝒳 and contains every mixture of two credence functions 
whenever it contains those credence functions. We denote the convex hull 𝒳+. The closure of a 
set is the union of that set with the set of its limit points. 
44 Hartry Field, “What Is the Normative Role of Logic?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
(Supplementary Volumes) 83 (2009): 251–268.  
45 Ernest W. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), Dorothy Edgington, 
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(BP14) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴1) + ⋯ +
𝑐(𝐴𝑛) − (𝑛 − 1) ≤ 𝑐(𝐵) 
Or, equivalently and more intuitively: 
(BP14) If ⊨cl governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐵) ≤ 𝑐(𝐴1) + ⋯ +
𝑐(𝐴𝑛) 
where 𝑐(𝑋): = 1 − 𝑐(𝑋) measures an agent’s degree of disbelief in 𝑋 when 𝑐(𝑋) 
measures her degree of belief in 𝑋. 
Here’s the argument: it is easy to see that, if ⊨cl governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵 and 
𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨cl 𝐵, then, for each logically possible world 𝑤, the ideal credence 
function 𝑣𝑤 satisfies (BP14). That is,46 
𝑣𝑤(𝐴1) + ⋯ + 𝑣𝑤(𝐴𝑛) − (𝑛 − 1) ≤ 𝑣𝑤(𝐵) 
What’s more, whenever two credence functions satisfy (BP14), so does every 
convex combination of them. And whenever each credence function in an infinite 
sequence satisfies (BP14), so does the limit of that sequence. Thus, every credence 
function in the closed convex hull of the ideal credence functions satisfies (BP14). 
And thus, by Lemma 6, any credence function that violates (BP14) is strictly 
logically dominated. This establishes (BP14). 
Non-Classical Logics 
What happens when we move from classical logic to a non-classical alternative? 
The key issue here is to determine, for each possible world 𝑤, what the vindicated 
credence function 𝑣𝑤 is at that world. In the classical case, 
𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = {
1  if 𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐭
0  if 𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐟
 
But what about the non-classical case? Here is one suggestion:47 
𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = {
1  if 𝑤(𝐴) is designated
0  if 𝑤(𝐴) is not designated
 
We might call this the Vindicated is Designated condition on epistemic 
utility. Notice that this is analogous to the suggestion in the full belief case that, if a 
proposition has designated truth value, then belief is the ideal categorical doxastic 
                                                                                                                      
“On conditionals,” Mind 104 (1995): 235–329. 
46 Proof.  There are two cases. First, if there is 𝐴𝑖 such that 𝑣𝑤(𝐴𝑖) = 0, then, since 𝑣𝑤(𝐴𝑗) ≤ 1 
for all 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛, 𝑣𝑤(𝐴1) + ⋯ + 𝑣𝑤(𝐴𝑛) − (𝑛 − 1) ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑣𝑤(𝐵). Second, if 𝑣𝑤(𝐴𝑖) = 1, for all 
𝐴𝑖, then 𝑣𝑤(𝐵) = 1 and 𝑣𝑤(𝐴1) + ⋯ + 𝑣𝑤(𝐴𝑛) − (𝑛 − 1) = 1 = 𝑣𝑤(𝐵). QED. 
47 J. R. G. Williams, “Gradational Accuracy and Non-Classical Semantics,” Review of Symbolic 
Logic 5, 4 (2012): 513–537. 
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attitude, with value 𝑅, while disbelief takes value −𝑊, and if that proposition has a 
non-designated truth value, then disbelief is the ideal attitude, with value 𝑅, while 
belief takes value −𝑊. In the credal case, we can then appeal to a result due to Jeff 
Paris to provide epistemic utility arguments for various bridge principles for a wide 
variety of non-classical logics.48 
Theorem 7 
Suppose: 
i. The logical consequence relation for a many-valued logic k is defined in 
terms of the preservation of designated truth values. 
ii. 𝑤(𝑋 & 𝑌) is designated iff 𝑤(𝑋) and 𝑤(𝑌) are both designated. 
iii. 𝑤(𝑋 ∨ 𝑌) is designated iff 𝑤(𝑋) or 𝑤(𝑌) is designated. 
iv. 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = {
1  if 𝑤(𝐴) is designated
0  if 𝑤(𝐴)is not designated
 
v. EU(𝑐, 𝑤) = ∑ eu𝑋∈ℱ (𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) = − ∑ 𝔡𝑋∈ℱ (𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) 
Then: 
a. 𝑐 is strictly logically dominated if it is not a generalized probability 
function for logic k. 
That is, 𝑐 is strictly logically dominated if it fails to satisfy any of the following 
bridge principles: 
(BP14a) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, then ⊨k 𝐴, then 𝑐(𝐴) = 1 
(BP14b) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, then 𝐴 ⊨k, then 𝑐(𝐴) = 0 
(BP15) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨k 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴) ≤ 𝑐(𝐵) 
(BP16) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴 & 𝐵) + 𝑐(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵) = 𝑐(𝐴) + 𝑐(𝐵) 
In fact, we only require (ii) and (iii) in order to infer (BP16), which is not a 
logic-rationality bridge principle. Thus, if we are interested only in the bridge 
principles, we can prove a more general theorem. This is the credal analogue to 
Theorem 2:49 
                                                        
48Proof.  Paris proves that, if logic k satisfies (i), (ii), and (iii), and if 𝑣𝑤 is defined as in (iv), then 
the closed convex hull of the set of vindicated credence functions is precisely the set of credence 
functions that satisfy (BP14-16). We then simply apply Lemma 6 to obtain the theorem. QED. 
49 Proof.  Note that, if (i) and (ii) hold, then (BP14a), (BP14b), and (BP15) are all satisfied by each 
of the vindicated credence functions. What’s more, when those conditions are satisfied by two 
credence functions, they are also satisfied by any convex combination of them; and when they 
are satisfied by each credence function in a sequence, they are also satisfied by the limit, if such 
exists. Thus, they are satisfied by everything in the closed convex hull of the vindicated credence 
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Theorem 8 
Suppose: 
i. The logical consequence relation for a many-valued logic k is defined in 
terms of the preservation of designated truth values. 
ii. 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) = {
1  if 𝑤(𝐴) is designated
0  if 𝑤(𝐴)is not designated
 
iii. EU(𝑐, 𝑤) = ∑ eu𝑋∈ℱ (𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) = − ∑ 𝔡𝑋∈ℱ (𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) 
Then: 
a. 𝑐 is weakly dominated if it fails to satisfy any of the following bridge 
principles: 
(BP14a) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, then ⊨k 𝐴, then 𝑐(𝐴) = 1 
(BP14b) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, then 𝐴 ⊨k, then 𝑐(𝐴) = 0 
(BP15) If ⊨k governs 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨k 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴) ≤ 𝑐(𝐵) 
Thus, we have the following epistemic utility argument for the logics in 
question: 
(EU10) Bregman Divergence + Vindicated is Designated + Strict Logical 
Dominance ⇒ (BP14-15). 
And, as in the classical case, we can also establish 
(BP17) If ⊨k governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1 … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨k 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴1) + ⋯ + 𝑐(𝐴𝑛) −
(𝑛 − 1) ≤ 𝑐(𝐵) 
That is, 
(BP17) If ⊨k governs 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, 𝐵, and 𝐴1 … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊨k 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐵) ≤ 𝑐(𝐴1) + ⋯ +
𝑐(𝐴𝑛) 
So we obtain Field’s logic-rationality bridge principle for all such logics. 
However, as in the full belief case, while this may be the correct account of 
epistemic value for Field’s use of strong Kleene logic or Priest’s use of Logic of 
Paradox, it is not obviously the correct account for the application of strong Kleene 
logic to vague propositions nor the application of Logic of Paradox to propositions 
concerning future contingents. But, as the following theorem shows, as soon as we 
abandon this account of epistemic value, we lose the No Drop principle, (BP15), 
and with it the logic-rationality bridge principle that Field endorses, namely, 
(BP17). This is the analogue of Theorem 3:50 
                                                                                                                      
functions. QED. 
50 Proof.  The truth value i from (iv) is either designated or undesignated. Suppose first that i is 
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Theorem 9 
Suppose: 
i. The logical consequence relation for a many-valued logic k is defined in 
terms of the preservation of designated truth values. 
ii. 𝐴 ⊨k 𝐵 
iii. If 𝑤(𝑋) = 𝐭, then 𝑣𝑤(𝑋) = 1; and if 𝑤(𝑋) = 𝐟, then 𝑣𝑤(𝑋) = 0. 
iv. There is truth value i such that, if 𝑤(𝑋) = 𝐢, then 0 < 𝑣𝑤(𝑋) < 1. 
v. EU(𝑐, 𝑤) = ∑ eu𝑋∈ℱ (𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) = − ∑ 𝔡𝑋∈ℱ (𝑣𝑤(𝑋), 𝑐(𝑋)) 
Then: 
a. There is an undominated credence function 𝑐 such that 𝑐(𝐴) > 𝑐(𝐵). 
For instance, suppose we define 𝑣𝑤 as follows for strong Kleene logic: 
𝑣𝑤(𝐴) =  {
1  if 𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐭
1
2
  if 𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐮
0  if 𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐟
 
This seems natural when the propositions in question include vague 
properties and they are governed by strong Kleene logic. If we do this, we can no 
longer establish the following version of (BP15): 
(BP15 skl) If ⊨skl governs 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐴 ⊨skl 𝐵, then 𝑐(𝐴) ≤ 𝑐(𝐵). 
Suppose 𝐴 ⊨skl 𝐵. This does not preclude a possible world 𝑤 such that 
𝑤(𝐴) = 𝐮, but 𝑤(𝐵) = 𝐟. But in that world 𝑣𝑤(𝐴) =
1
2
 and 𝑣𝑤(𝐵) = 0. Thus, 
𝑣𝑤(𝐴) > 𝑣𝑤(𝐵). 
The upshot of this section is similar to the upshot of our earlier section on 
bridge principles for beliefs in the presence of non-classical logics: the fate of logic-
rationality bridge principles is sensitive to the logic that governs the propositions 
in question, the interpretation of the truth values in that logic, and the credences 
we thereby identify as vindicated. 
 
                                                                                                                      
designated. Then there is a logical possibility 𝑤∗, where 𝐴 takes 𝐭 and 𝐵 takes i. And in this case 
𝑣𝑤∗(𝐵) < 𝑣𝑤∗(𝐴), by (iv). Since 𝑣𝑤∗  is a vindicated credence function, it is in the closed convex 
hull of the vindicated credence functions. Thus, it is undominated. Next, suppose that i is 
undesignated. Then there is a logical possibility 𝑤†, where 𝐴 takes i and 𝐵 takes 𝐟. And in this 
case 𝑣𝑤†(𝐵) < 𝑣𝑤†(𝐴), by (iv). Since 𝑣𝑤† is a vindicated credence function, it is in the closed 
convex hull of the vindicated credence functions. Thus, it is undominated. QED. 
Richard Pettigrew 
492 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored a novel way to adjudicate between the vast variety 
of putative logic-rationality bridge principles that purport to govern our full 
beliefs, disbeliefs, and suspensions of judgment, as well as the bridge principles that 
purport to govern our credences. We have deployed epistemic utility theory to 
discover which bridge principles are justified by considerations of the epistemic 
value that accrues to our doxastic attitudes in virtue of their accuracy. Our 
conclusions are a mixed bag. With very weak and natural assumptions about the 
epistemic utility of categorical doxastic attitudes the classical single-premise case 
for full belief, we found compelling arguments for the principles that most of the 
literature agree upon: if 𝐴 entails 𝐵, then you ought not to believe 𝐴 and disbelieve 
𝐵, you ought not to believe 𝐴 and suspend on 𝐵, and thus you ought to see to it 
that, if you believe 𝐴, and you adopt any attitude towards 𝐵, that attitude should 
be belief, providing 𝐴 is not a contradiction. However, the picture is more 
complicated when we move to the classical multi-premise case and the non-
classical single- and multi-premise cases. In these cases, the ways in which we 
assign epistemic utility to doxastic attitudes becomes very relevant. For instance, 
we obtain an epistemic utility argument for the multi-premise version of the 
principle that we justified in the single-premise case only if we assume that the 
badness of believing incorrectly is much greater than the goodness of believing 
correctly. And, in the non-classical case, whether or not the corresponding version 
of this principle holds depends on our account of the ideal doxastic attitude 
towards propositions with non-classical truth values. 
